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Fraud Between Sexual Partners
Regarding the Use of Contraceptives
INTRODUCTION
When sexual intercourse between consenting adults results in
the birth of a child, may one adult hold the other liable because
of a false representation that contraceptive precautions had been
taken? When the mother falsely represented to the father that
she was using contraceptives, should the mother's deceit be a de-
fense to a claim for child support from the father? The static
legal principle known as "fraud" is general in its definition and
designed to have a broad application suited to the multiplicity of
situations susceptible to fraud.' However, the cause of action for
and defense of fraud generally contemplate deception of one
party by another in a bargained transaction.2 Most persons
would hardly think of words spoken and promises made during
sexual intimacy as a "bargained transaction." Thus far, courts in
only two jurisdictions have even considered application of fraud
principles to a false representation that contraceptives had been
used. A California court denied a cause of action for fraud;3 a
New York court denied a defense of fraud in a support action,
modifying the trial court's decision allowing fraud as a limited
defense. 4
1 See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (fraud action
against physician for statements that sterilization means no pregnancies); Sanford Constr.
Co. v. S & H Contractors, Inc., 443 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1969) (subcontractor suit for fraud
against contractor); McIntyre v. Lyon, 37 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. 1949) (alleged fraud in
stock transaction).
2 Even the purely tort action for fraudulent misrepresentation had its origins in
"bargained transactions." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TOaRTS § 105 (4th ed.
1971).
3 Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
4 Pamela P. v. Frank S., 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 1982), rev'g 443 N.Y.S.2d
343 (Fain. Ct. 1981).
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In the California case, Stephen K. v. Roni L.,5 mother and
child brought a paternity suit; the father admitted paternity but
counterclaimed for the mother's false representation that she had
taken contraceptive measures. The court dismissed the father's
claim, holding that as "a matter of public policy the practice of
birth control . . . is best left to the individuals involved." ' The
court explained: "Despite its legalism, [the claim of misrepresen-
tation] is nothing more than asking the court to supervise the pro-
mises made between two consenting adults as to the circum-
stances of their private sexual conduct. To do so would encour-
age unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters affecting
the individual's right to privacy."7 Although the "governmental
intrusion" language and the cases cited in the opinion imply reli-
ance on the constitutional dimensions of right to privacy, the de-
cision turned more on the difficulty of applying legal concepts to
"highly intimate"'8 situations.
Pamela P. v. Frank S.9 also was a paternity action brought by
the mother. Here the father's defense to payment of child sup-
port was the mother's false representation that she had used con-
traceptives. The trial court did not hesitate to apply the legal ele-
ments of fraud to the situation. 10 Neither was the trial court hesi-
tant to consider "accepted standards for right conduct between
individuals"" despite the intimate nature of the parties' relation-
ship. The trial court held that child support can be denied if the
custodial parent can meet the child's needs. But the court also
held that if the mother's means are insufficient to give the child a
standard of living equal to the father's, the father will be re-
quired to pay support. The appellate court in Pamela P. refused
to allow use of the "limited" fraud defense created by the trial
court. 12 The appellate court reasoned that even if the father was
deceived, the child should not "suffer" consequences of the de-
5 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618.6 Id. at 621.
7 Id. at 620.
8Id.
9 451 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
'0 443 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Faro. Ct. 1981), modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 1982).
" 443 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
12 451 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
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ceit. 13 Apparently the appellate court did not agree that limiting
the defense of fraud to situations in which the child was other-
wise assured support would adequately protect the child. The
court went on to hold that once paternity is established, the only
inquiry left for the court is the amount of money required for the,
child's care and the proportionate contributions from each par-
ent, since any further inquiry into the fraud defense would con-
stitute an "invasion" of the constitutional right to privacy.14
Although the legal principles in Stephen K. and Pamela P.
are familiar, the specific topic discussed here is novel to the law.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the application of fraud
principles tomisrepresentations between sexual partners regard-
ing the use of contraceptive precautions. The specific issues dis-
cussed are: 1) application of the necessary elements of fraud; 2)
practical considerations and public policy; 3) problems peculiar
to the defensive use of fraud in child support cases; and 4) consti-
tutional issues-the right to privacy and the freedom of choice of
procreation. This Note will survey the arguments both for and
against application of fraud principles to cases of deceit by one
sexual partner regarding the use of contraceptives, concluding
that, if narrowly drawn, both the cause of action for fraud and
the defense of fraud should be recognized.
I. FRAUD
The legal principle of fraudulent misrepresentation or deceit
evolved in the context of bargained transactions and originally
was inextricably bound with contract actions.' 5 However, the
elements of fraud are flexible enough to be adapted to and con-
13 Id. at 767.
14 Id.
15See note 2 supra and accompanying text. See also Ligon v. Minton, 125 S.W. 304
(Ky. 1910); Kaplan v. Suher, 150 N.E. 9 (Mass. 1926); Chamberlin v. Fuller, 9 A. 832
(Vt. 1887). The tort discussed in this Note is referred to by various names, including fraud,
deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional representation. See, e.g., Bridgess v.
Youree, 430 F. Supp. 458, 459 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (fraud); Combs v. Chambers, 238 F.
Supp. 295, 297 (N.D. Okla. 1968) (fraud); Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619
(fraud); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (fraud and deceit); Johnson v. Eagle,
355 P.2d 868, 870 (Okla. 1960) (fraud and misrepresentation); 4A R. BENOIT, M. FRIED-
MAN, J. COFSKY, L. PILGRIM & L. ZUCKERMAN, PERSONAL INJURY § 1.01(2) (1980).
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sidered in the situation of misrepresentation regarding the use of
contraceptives. The established elements of fraud are: 1) a mate-
rial misrepresentation of existing fact; 2) falsity of the representa-
tion; 3) scienter or recklessness; 4) intent to induce reliance; 5)
actual reliance; and 6) damages caused by the reliance. 6 The
party alleging fraud must prove all of the elements. 7 The follow-
ing sections are a discourse on the problems involved in establish-
ing fraud when one sexual partner misrepresents to the other
partner that contraceptive precautions have been taken.
A. Materiality
An objective standard is generally used to determine the
"materiality" of misrepresentation."s However, the test for mate-
riality of a misrepresentation regarding the use of contraceptives
is necessarily somewhat subjective. Although a representation
that contraceptives are used may determine whether sexual
intercourse will occur, the key word is "may." In the "passion of
the moment" the risk of pregnancy may preclude sexual inter-
course for some people but may not deter others. To the extent
that the risk deters only some people, the materiality of the mis-
representation is subjective. Thus, the misrepresentation should
not be considered material unless the person alleging fraud can
prove he or she would not have engaged in sexual intercourse
without the use of contraceptives.
In proving materiality, simply testifying "I would not have
had sexual intercourse" should not constitute sufficient proof;
this would completely circumvent the materiality element. How-
ever, materiality can be shown in at least two ways: 1) the indi-
vidual expressed concern to the sexual partner about contracep-
16 Scott v. Farmers State Bank, 410 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Ky. 1966); McIntyre v. Lyon,
37 N.W.2d at 904; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525,526,537, 538 (1976).
17 Sanford Constr. Co. v. S & H Contractors, Inc., 443 S.W.2d at 227.
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1976). That section states:
"The matter is material if a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question." The next
subsection allows for subjectivity in the materiality element. That section states: "The
matter is material if the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it." Id. § 538(2)(b).
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tives and conveyed the message that sexual intercourse would not
occur without precautionary measures; and 2) other sexual part-
ners' testimony that contraceptive use was important enough to
determine the occurrence of sexual intercourse. But the sexual
partner, as an opposing party, would have an almost overwhelm-
ing motive to lie, so this could easily become an inconclusive
"swearing contest."
B. Falsity
Although this element may seem easy to establish, affirma-
tive proof of falsity might be difficult to produce. 19 The party
denying fraud might explain that he or she used contraceptives
which simply did not prevent pregnancy.20 The party alleging
fraud has the burden of proof2' and will lose unless he or she can
accomplish the difficult task of affirmatively proving that contra-
ceptives were not used.
C. Scienter
In most jurisdictions scienter is a necessary element of
fraud. 22 The requisite scienter exists if the tort-feasor either
knows or believes the "matter" is not as he or she represents, does
not have confidence in the accuracy of the representation or
knows he or she has no basis for the representation.2 Scienter dis-
19 See Dolle v. Melrose Properties, 67 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1934) (affirmative proof of
falsity is necessary for recovery).
20 Short of sterilization, the birth control pill is the most effective method of contra-
ception, with a 99% rate of prevention. See H. Michlewitz, Birth Control 8 (1979)
(limited circulation). This means that the "pill" has a one percent failure rate. Id.
21 Sanford Constr. Co. v. S & H Contractors, Inc., 443 S.W.2d at 227.
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOTS § 526 (1976). See Bunch v. Betram, 294 S.W.
805, 807-08 (Ky. 1927) (if the defendant does not know whether assertions are true, scien-
ter requirement may be met).
23 E.g., Vincent v. Corbett, 47 So. 641, 642 (Miss. 1908); Mason v. Moore, 76 N.E.
932, 936 (Ohio 1906). The scienter requirement is sometimes circumvented by courts
through the doctrine of "constructive fraud." Constructive fraud "exists where conduct,
though not actually fraudulent, had all actual consequences and legal effects of actual
fraud." BLAcics LAw DICTIONARY 284 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Utilizing this concept, courts
find fraud regardless of intent when conduct occurs which the law finds has a tendency to
deceive. Wood v. Kirby, 566 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Ky. 1978); Keeton Packing Co. v. State,
437 S.W.2d 20, 27-28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
tinguishes fraud from cases of negligent misrepresentation. For
example, in Alice D. v. William M.,2 a woman sued to recover
costs of an abortion, alleging that the defendant-sexual partner
had misrepresented to her that he was sterile. The plaintiff re-
covered, but on the basis of negligence rather than fraud because
the defendant lacked the necessary scienter.25 He honestly be-
lieved he was sterile, but was mistaken.
One legal principle certain to thwart recovery for fraudulent
representations regarding the use of contraceptives is the "puff-
ing" rule.2 6 The puffing rule can be a defense to actions for fraud
and is generally applied in cases involving business transactions. z2
Under the puffing rule, a salesperson is not liable for exagger-
ations of the truth because a certain amount of exaggeration is
expected in business transactions and no reasonable person
would believe the representations.2 Words spoken and promises
made during sexual intimacy may be tainted with the often vola-
tile and impetuous nature of the moment. Therefore, it might be
argued that assurances made immediately before sexual inter-
course, including those regarding the use of contraceptives, are a
form of "puffing" which no reasonable person would believe. z
D. Intent to Induce Reliance
An important element of 'fraud is the tortfeasor's intent to
cause the other party to rely on the misrepresentation. - In
24 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Civ. Ct. 1982).
25 Id. at 354-55. See McAfee v. Rockford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 352 N.E.2d 50
(fl. App. Ct. 1976); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976).
26 See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at § 109; Harper & McNeely, A Synthesis of the
Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REV. 939, 1004 (1938), for discussions of the puff-
ing rule.
27 See, e.g., Thorpe v. Cooley, 165 N.W. 265 (Minn. 1917); Black v. Irvin, 149 P.
540 (Or. 1915).
28 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at § 109.
29 As Shakespeare wrote in Romeo and Juliet, "[Alt lovers' perjuries, They say Jove
laughs." W. SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, II, ii, 92-93.
'1 Many jurisdictions do not expressly list "intent to induce reliance" as an element of
fraud. Rather, as a shorthand expression, the elements are listed as: a material misrepre-
sentation, which is false, scienter, deception (or reliance) and injury. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Owens, 140 S.E.2d 311, 313 (N.C. 1965); Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d at 354;
Radio KBUY, Inc. v. Lieurance, 390 S.W.2d 16,20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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Pamela P. ,31 the woman, who misrepresented to a man that she
was using contraceptives, "wanted to have a baby." 32 The birth
of a child was the intended result of the woman's misrepresenta-
tion. A different situation is presented when the intended result
of the misrepresentation is the act of sexual intercourse. The two
situations may be different enough to require different results. In
Pamela P., the woman was not in a very sympathetic position.
She wanted to have a child; to achieve that result she misrepre-
sented to her sexual partner that she was using contraceptives.
The trial court had no difficulty allowing the man's defense of
fraud to payment of child support. However, if the woman only
intended to have sexual intercourse and did not intend to have a
child, the woman's intent would not seem as pernicious. A court
may be less inclined to find that the requisite intent exists in the
latter situation, especially if a finding of intent would prevent a
child support order.
E. Actual Reliance
Proof of sexual intercourse and proof of non-use of contra-
ceptive protection should prove reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion. However, since no method of contraceptive protection is
100 % effective,, the person "defrauded" may never be justified
in relying on the representations that a sexual partner has taken
contraceptive precautions. Thus, proof of justifiable reliance on
the misrepresentation can be difficult and fatal to a cause of ac-
tion for or defense of fraud. It was persuasive to the California
court in Stephen K. 4 which noted:
As to Stephen's claim that he was tricked into fathering a child
he did not want, no good reason appears why he himself could
not have taken any precautionary measures. Even if Roni had
regularly been taking birth control pills, that method, though
considered to be the most reliable means of birth control, is not
100 percent effective. 5
31 443 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
32 Id. at 344.
33 See note 20supra.





"Damage causation" is the element of fraud most difficult to
apply to misrepresentations regarding the use of contraceptives.
In the traditional fraud action, damages for fraud are supposed
to compensate the party defrauded for the loss sustained and
place the defrauded party in the position he or she would have
had if the fraud had not occurred. 3 In the typical case of fraud-
ulent representations regarding the use of contraceptives it will
be impossible to place the defrauded party in the same position
since a child has been born and the defrauded party is now a par-
ent (biologically, if not legally).
The majority position in the traditional fraud action follows
a "benefit of bargain" rule for measuring recovery. 37 Recovery is
measured by the difference between the value of what the de-
frauded party would have received without the misrepresenta-
tion and the value of what the defrauded party actually re-
ceived.-" The majority position's measure of recovery cannot
easily be adapted to fraud actions for misrepresentations between
sexual partners. Without the misrepresentation, the deceived
party would not have received the "pleasure" of sexual inter-
course. With the misrepresentation, the deceived party receives
the "intangible benefit of having a child"3 9 as well as the disad-
vantages of having a child, such as child support. The measure of
damages under the majority position would require weighing the
act of sexual intercourse against the benefit and detriment of
having a child. Not only is such a weighing ludicrous, it is impos-
sible. Furthermore, damages would be pure speculation and
- therefore not recoverable in a fraud action. 40
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1976).
37 Dempsey v. Marshall, 344 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ky. 1961).
38 Id. at 606; Miller v. Higgins, 452 S.W.2d 121, 124-25 (Mo. 1970); Lamb v. Ban-
gart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974).
39 Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620. Stephen K. denies the cause of ac-
tion for fraudulent representations that birth control had been used. One way the court
distinguished California cases which allowed a cause of action for wrongful birth was the
fact that the wrongful birth cases involve actions against "third-party physicians." Id. The
court then mentioned a Wisconsin case in which the "intangible benefits of having a child"
rationale was persuasive. Id. (citing Reick v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242
(Wis. 1974)).
40 See Melvin v. H.J. Nassar Motor Co., 246 N.E.2d 679, 680 (Mass. 1969).
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However, refusing recovery because the damage does not fit
the formula also is ludicrous. When the father is defrauded, he
can prove a specific amount of damages by showing the amount
of child support paid. If the custodial parent is defrauded, he or
she can prove damages not only in terms of dollars, but also in
time spent caring for the child. When the mother is defrauded,
damage incurred includes the physical effects on her body, the
monetary cost of childbirth and lost earnings incurred because of
childbirth.
One argument to reduce damage recovery is that there are
"intangible benefits of having a child." 4' The major flaw with
this argument is that a defrauded parent may not have or want
either custody or visitation of the child and therefore will not be
a recipient of the intangible benefits.
G. Summary
Even if the cause of action or defense for fraudulent misrep-
resentations that contraceptives were used is recognized, the de-
frauded party will have a myriad of problems establishing his or
her case. Many of the problems are proof problems difficult to
overcome not only because the two sexual partners are the only
people who know what really happened, but also because of the
precarious setting of the misrepresentation-the sexually inti-
mate environment.
II. PUBLIC POLICY AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Fairness
Proof problems aside, should there be either a cause of action
for or a defense of fraud for misrepresentations regarding the use
of contraceptives? As one author noted: "When for one reason or
another there is a disagreement about the application of the law,
the question of the just rule arises." 42 In the context of fraudulent
misrepresentations, if a party can prove all of the elements of the
41 See 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
42 C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 65 (1963).
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long-recognized action for fraud, fairness dictates that he or she
should recover. This would compensate him or her for an actual
loss caused by the other party. Recovery would set a standard for
future conduct which would discourage deceit. A remedy in the
courts also would afford the aggrieved party some satisfaction.
Court remedy would be preferable to continued disharmony,
especially when an innocent child is involved. Also, court remedy
would help deter the less desirable remedy, self help.
B. Intimacy
In Stephen K. v. Roni L., the court refused to address the
question of whether Stephen (the defrauded party) had "estab-
lished or pleaded tort liability 43 because public policy forbade
defining a standard of conduct in this "highly intimate" 44 rela-
tionship. The counterargument is that courts have already recog-
nized many causes of action which also involve highly intimate
relationships. Such actions include those for: 1) loss of spousal
consortium; 4, 2) a parent's suit for loss of a child's consortium, 46
or in a few jurisdictions, a child's action for loss of parental con-
sortium; 47 3) paternity determination; 48 and 4) taking improper
familarities. 49
Furthermore, it can be argued that in "highly intimate" rela-
tions, the parties are more likely to trust each other and are
43 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
44 Id. at 620.
45 E.g., Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302
N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972).
46 Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an In-
jured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 607-13 (1976).47 E.g., Weiti v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connells
Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981).
48 E.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 313 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1958); James v. Commonwealth,
227 S.W. 562 (Ky. 1921). Note also that Pamela P., 443 N.Y.S.2d at 343, was a contested
paternity action. Therefore, the "highly intimate" relationship would have been brought
out in court regardless of the fraud defense.
49 E.g., Koch v. Stone, 332 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1960). See generally Ragsdale v. Ezell,
49 S.W. 775 (Ky. 1899) (allows recovery in assault case where man forcibly hugged and
kissed a woman); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920) (recovery by ,ffe against
husband after he infected her with venereal disease).
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therefore more easily deceived50 than in the "arm's length" trans-
action. Therefore, courts should be more inclined to allow recov-
ery for fraud when a "highly intimate" relationship is subverted.
In Alice D. v. William M. ,s' the court apparently was persuaded
by this argument. Recovery was allowed for the man's negligent
representation of sterility where the sexual partners had an inti-
mate and serious relationship. But the judge explained: "Had
their love-making resulted from a more casual encounter, I
might have resolved the issue of reliance differently." 52
C. Reproductive Responsibility
A constitutional guarantee of "freedom of choice to use con-
traception and avoid procreation 53 is emerging. Along with this
right, a reciprocal duty on both men and women to be responsi-
ble for birth control also is emerging.4 Therefore, the argument
by the deceived sexual partner that he or she reasonably relied on
representations that the other partner was using contraception
may be unfounded. Both partners should be responsible for con-
traceptive precautions.s5 However, there is a persuasive counter-
argument. The deceived, party who can prove that he or she in-
quired about contraception and would not have engaged in sex-
ual intercourse without assurance that adequate precautions had
been taken may be considered a "responsible" person although he
or she did not use contraception.
"0 This argument is analogous to situations involving fiduciaries. In such situations,
the law generally imposes upon the parties a more stringent duty of disclosure of all mate-
rial facts. Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 196 N.W.2d 619, 622-23 (Minn. 1972). See
Lewis v. Lewis, 187 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. 1972) (duty imposed in relationship between stepson
and stepmother); Feist v. Roesler, 86 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (duty imposed in
relationship between friends).
5' 450 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
52 Id. at 354.
3 Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (citing Carey v. Population Serv., 431
U.S. 678, 684-91 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-49, 453 (1972).
54 See H. Michelewitz, supra note 20, at 18,-22, 24 (includes discussion of birth con-
trol methods such as the condom, coitus interruptus, and sterilization for men).





In Pamela P. v. Frank S., the trial court, even though it al-
lowed the fraud defense between unmarried sexual partners, ex-
plicitly refused to decide whether it would allow a defense of
fraud if the sexual partner-parents were married.56 It did indicate
in dictum that the defense should not be available to married
partners by noting that "marriage is ordinarily deemed to repre-
sent a willingness to procreate."57
In a cause of action for fraud between married persons, as
opposed to the defense of fraud, one might argue that the inter-
spousal immunity doctrine should prevent recovery.' One of the
major justifications for the immunity doctrine is that allowing
suits between married people would create disharmony in the
family unit.59 However, if the status of the marriage is such that
one partner deceived the other about the use of contraceptives
and the deceived partner wants to sue for fraud, it seems logical
to conclude that there is no "harmony" in the family unit any-
way. Furthermore, a majority of jurisdictions have either abol-
ished or severely restricted the interspousal immunity doctrine. 60
E. Fornication and Adultery
In Alice D. v. William M., the argument was raised that de-
spite the misrepresentation regarding the use of contraception,
recovery should be refused because the sexual relationship was
adulterous.6' The argument was based on the "clean hands" doc-
trine under which the claim "'tainted with deceit or impurity of
motive . . . will unhesitatingly be ignored."'62 The argument is
" 443 N.Y.S.2d at 346. Note that the appeals court denied the defense altogether.
451 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
57 443 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
58 For a discussion of the interspousal immunity doctrine, see W. PROSSER, supra
note 2, at § 122.
59 Id. Contra Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113-14 (Ky. 1968) ("court does
not consider sound the claimed potential of family disunity").
6o W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at § 122. See, e.g., Combs v. Combs, 262 S.W.2d 821
(Ky. 1953); Brown v. Cosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Brown v. Selby, 332 S.W.2d
166 (Tenn. 1960) (suit allowed after divorce).
61 450 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
62 Id. at 355 (quoting 20 N.Y. JuR. EQuITY § 103).
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derived from the fact that criminal statutes6 and religious
valuesl have for a long time reflected a public policy against for-
nication and adultery. This policy suggests that one who engages
in fornication or adultery is "tainted with deceit or impurity of
motive." Therefore, the clean hands doctrine should be used to
prevent those engaging in such relationships from using the
courts to recover for fraudulent representations that contracep-
lives had been used. Furthermore, preventing recovery for fraud
in cases of fornication or adultery might serve the public policy
by deterring such relationships.
However, the criminal statutes prohibiting fornication and
adultery are rarely enforced today.6 In Alice D., for example,
the court refused to apply the clean hands doctrine because the
criminal statute penalizing adultery had not been enforced in
more than thirty years. 6 Because these statutes are not enforced
and because of more relaxed sexual standards, an increasing
number of persons fornicate and engage in adulterous relation-
ships.67 Therefore, public policy seems to have changed-there is
acknowledgement, if not acceptance, of sexual relationships be-
tween persons not married to each other. Since the policy has
changed, one could argue that the clean hands doctrine should
not be used to prevent recovery for fraud simply because the sex-
ual partners were not married to each other.
F. Ramifications for the Future
One goal of public policy is to prevent spurious claims and
defenses. 5 If the defense of fraud is allowed in paternity-support
actions, the possibility exists that alleged fathers will use fraud-
ulent representations by the mother as to the use of birth control
6 See M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW ch. 5 (1951), for a discussion of criminal
sanctions for adultery and fornication. See G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND
THE LAW § 6.1-.51 (1979), for a state-by-state discussion of statutes on fornication and
adultery.
64 See I Corinthians 6:9; Leviticus 20:10.
6 M. PLOSCOWE, supra note 63, at 155-57.
1 450 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
67 See M. PLOSCOWE,supra note 63, at 136.
C Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974) (recognized prevention of
spurious claims as legitimate governmental interest although not applicable in that case).
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as a "standard defense," regardless of the merit in the defense.
Such abuse would militate against allowing the defense of fraud
in paternity-support actions. The counterargument, however, is
that if paternity is not proved, the alleged father must admit pa-
ternity before he can successfully use the defense of fraud in a
paternity-support action.69 A counterweighing policy to spurious
defenses may be the public policy favoring legitimacy of chil-
dren.70 Since admitting paternity would simplify the legitimation
process, maybe the defense of fraud with its concomitant admis-
sion of paternity should be allowed and even encouraged.
Another ramification is the possibility that recognition of this
cause of action arising in the context of the sexually intimate rela-
tionship will expose sexual intimacy to a host of other causes of
action. 7 This would be undesirable because, by its very nature,
sexual intimacy is somewhat spontaneous and unpremeditated.
If an array of suits could flow from the act of sexual intercourse,
undesirable constraints might be placed on sexual intimacy.
III. PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO THE DEFENSIVE USE OF FRAUD
In Pamela P. v. Frank S., a fraud defense prevailed in the
lower court in a paternity-support action brought by the mother
against the father.72 Defensive use of fraud in paternity-support
actions presents problems peculiar to the situation. In a cause of
action for fraud based on a misrepresentation of contraceptive
precaution, the dispute is only between the two parties. Except
for consideration of damages, the child is not a participant in the
dispute. However, where the putative father raises fraud as a de-
fense in a paternity-support action, the child is inevitably af-
69 See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (father admitted paternity, then
counterclaimed for fraud); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (fraud defense util-
ized after proof of paternity).
70 See Williams v. Williams, 223 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1949); G. DOtJTHV ATE, supra
note 63, § 3.1, at 116.
71 For example, a Florida woman recently sued her former sexual partner for giving
her genital herpes. The newspaper account noted that this suit might be the first of its kind
in the nation. The Lexington Leader, Nov. 4, 1982, at A12, col. 2 (Bluegrass ed.). But cf.
Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. at 206 (recovery by wife against husband after he infected
her with venereal disease).
72 443 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
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fected by the outcome because the suit determines child support.
Therefore, courts also must consider the interests of the child
when deciding whether to recognize the fraud defense.
A. Child Support
Due to the nature of the paternity-support proceeding, the
children affected generally are children with unmarried parents,
traditionally called "illegitimate" children.73 At common law, li-
gitimacy was contingent upon a lawful marriage.7 4 The "illegit-
imate" child was filius nulius, a child of no one.75 The parents
owed no obligation of support or maintenance to the "illegit-
imate" child and the "illegitimate" child could not inherit from
his or her parents. 76
As the law evolved, the mother, as the parent entitled to cus-
tody, became the parent responsible for support of the "illegit-
imate" child. 77 Today, statutes generally create a duty of support
in the father as well.7 8 Some states, however, phrase support stat-
utes in terms of the mother's right to child support.7 9 These stat-
utes may be particularly susceptible to the defense of fraud com-
mitted by the mother because they are phrased in terms of an
award to the mother.
Some state statutes contain built-in formulas for determining
support awards. 80 These statutes may obstruct the defense of
fraud in support actions because once paternity is established,
the amount of support is fixed. Most support statutes, however,
73 Other less stigmatizing terms include "children with unwed parents" and "chil-
dren with single parents."
74 For discussions of this statement and common law legitimacy in general, see G.
DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63, at § 3.1; M. PLOSCOWE, supra note 63, at 101-04.
75 G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63, § 3.1, at 112; H. KRAUSE, ILLECITIMACY. LAW
AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971).
76 0. DOUTHWvAITE, supra note 63, § 3.1, at 112.
77 Id. § 3.5, at 132.
78 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83); Ky. REV. STAT. §
406.011 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS]; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 271 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-1 (1977).
79 S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-8-5 (1976).




do not fix specific amounts for child support awards."' The deter-
mination of the amount of child support is left to the court.8 2
These statutes therefore are susceptible to the fraud defense; be-
cause the court has a "free hand" to determine the support
award, it may be adjusted downward as a way of recognizing
that the father was defrauded and also as a way of "punishing"
the mother for her conduct. The problem with this manipulation
is that the mother may not have the means to make up for the de-
ficiency. Thus, the child is the one who is "punished" for the
mother's fraudulent conduct. This would be an undesired result
and a reversion to the outdated concept that the "sins" of the par-
ent are visited upon the child.8 3
The trial court in Pamela P. v. Frank S. recognized that the
"ancient and enduring interest here at stake is parental support
for helpless children." 84 This recognition compelled the court to
reach a compromise, accommodating the principles of fraud
with the concept of child support. The court allowed the father's
defense of fraud and held that the mother's application for child
support could be denied. But the court also held that the support
order could nevertheless be entered against the father if the
mother's means prove insufficient to give the child a standard of
living equal to the father's standard of living. The appellate court
was not convinced that this compromise would safeguard the
child's interests and therefore rejected even a limited defense of
fraud . 5
The current trend is to create equal responsibility in both
parents for care and support of the child with consideration
given to the financial resources of the parents.88 How this trend
will affect the fraud defense is unclear. But it can be suggested
that since the important concern is meeting the needs of the
81 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.25 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-83); KRS § 406.011
(Cum. Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 275, 281 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-45a-1 (1977).
82 The judge, as opposed to the jury, makes the determination.
83 See H. KRAUSE. supra note 75, at 2.
84 443 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
85 451 N.Y.S.2d at 767.




child, the fraud defense should be denied to the extent it would
impede meeting this concern.
B. Equal Protection
Under modern support statutes, once paternity is estab-
lished, the father incurs the same support obligation to his child
born out of wedlock as he does to his child born in wedlock.8 7 If
the defense of fraud in paternity-support actions is allowed to bar
payment of support, the child born out of wedlock will inevi-
tably be treated differently in terms of support than the child
born in wedlock. 8 This disparity in treatment might raise equal
protection problems. Recently, the United States Supreme Court
has often used the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment"9 to invalidate arbitrary distinctions drawn between
legitimate and illegitimate children. 9 In Gomez v. Perez,91 the
Court held that a state which gives legitimate children a right to
support from their fathers but denies the support right to illegit-
imate children constitutes an invidious discrimination violative
of the equal protection clause. Since the fraud defense in pater-
nity-support actions will generally preclude recovery only for il-
legitimate children, it may be found sufficiently analogous to
Gomez to be held unconstitutional. 92
87 E.g., KRS § 406.011 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
88 Marriage generally creates a presumption of legitimacy. E.g., People ex rel. Smith
v. Cobb, 337 N.E.2d 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); G. DOUTmvAiTE, supra note 63, § 3.1, at
115. Therefore, paternity-support actions would rarely involve children with married par-
ents. Moreover, even in actions for support only, marriage has been held to deem a will-
ingness to procreate. See 443 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
89 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The relevant portion provides: "No State
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." Id. See
also KY. CONST. § 3 which states: "All men ... are equal; and no grant of exclusive, sep-
arate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man ... "
90 See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. at 628; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
91 409 U.S. at 535.
92 In Gomez, the state court read a distinction into the statute so that treatment
under the statute distinguished legitimate from illegitimate children. Id. at 536-37. Here
the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children would exist through a com-
mon law, "court created" action or defense. Since there must be state action to raise a
fourteenth amendment equal protection claim, one would have to argue that, based on




Furthermore, the Court's standard of review of distinctions
based on legitimacy has been modified since Gomez. The new
standard is more stringent and distinctions based on legitimacy
are less likely to be upheld. The landmark decision under the old
standard was Levy v. Louisiana.9 In that case, the Louisiana
courts had found that only legitimate children could recover
under a statute allowing children to recover for the wrongful
death of a parent. The Court found that the Louisiana view
created an invidious discrimination and violated the equal pro-
tection clause.94 A flurry of other equal protection cases regard-
ing illegitimates was decided by the Court in the ten years after
Levy. 9' However, until 1977 the Court used a rational-basis test
to determine the constitutionality of distinctions based on legit-
imacy. Under this test, a classification based on legitimacy is con-
stitutional if rationally related to a legitimate state objective.96
Although many arbitrary distinctions based on legitimacy were
struck down under the rational-basis test,97 the test is the least
rigid of the Court's levels of equal protection scrutiny and some
arbitrary distinctions based on legitimacy were held permissible
under the test. 98
Beginning in 1977, the Court began to apply a stricter equal
protection test to classifications based on legitimacy.9 Under the
modified test, classifications based on legitimacy are valid only
"if they are substantially related to permissible state interests."'' 0
This new, more rigid standard, coupled with the Gomez case,
yields a cogent argument that allowing the fraud defense in pa-
ternity-support actions to preclude an award of child support is
an unconstitutional violation of equal protection because of its
disparate impact upon illegitimate children.'10 Although a state
93 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
14 Id. at 72.
95 See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); 406 U.S. at 164; Labine v. Vin-
cent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
96 406 U.S. at 172; 391 U.S. at 71.
97 See, e.g., 417 U.S. at 628; 409 U.S. at 535; 406 U.S. at 164.
98 See, e.g., 427 U.S. at 495; 401 U.S. at 532.
99 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
'oo Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978).
101 The fraud defense conceivably could be used by parents of children born "in wed-
lock" as well as by parents not married. But see note 88 supra, discussing the low probabil-
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might argue that the fraud defense is substantially related to a
permissible state interest in preventing fraud and in compensat-
ing those defrauded, this argument does not justify denying child
support altogether; rather, the compromise solution used by the
lower court in Pamela P. is available to assure child support. 102
IV. RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Supreme Court has recognized an implicit fundamental
right to privacy in the Constitution.0 3 The exact source of the
right to privacy is unclear; the Constitution does not explicitly
create the right. The right has been found to be implicit in the
liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, 1 4 the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights,'05 the ninth
amendment10 and the first amendment. 0 7 This right to privacy
ity of its use in cases involving married parents. The fraud defense does not on its face dis-
tinguish legitimate from illegitimate children (or married from unmarried parents). In
contrast, in Gomez, the state court read a distinction into the statute so that treatment
under the statute distinguished legitimate from illegitimate children. 409 U.S. at 536-37.
In equal protection cases involving distinctions based on race, if the state treat-
ment is not discriminatory on its face, discriminatory purpose must be established to win
an equal protection claim. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). A disparate impact
upon blacks is not enough to establish a discriminatory purpose; rather, one must look to
the "totality of the relevant facts" to determine whether there is an equal protection viola-
tion. 426 U.S. at 242. If the Washington v. Davis test for discriminatory purpose is ex-
tended to distinctions based on legitimacy, courts will have to look to the "totality of the
relevant facts" to determine whether the fraud defense violates equal protection because
the fraud defense does not on its face distinguish legitimate from illegitimate children. But
most paternity-support suits are between unmarried persons and the fraud defense gen-
erally would involve only illegitimate children. In light of the obvious impact upon illegit-
imate children, it would be difficult for a state to claim it lacked a discriminatory purpose
when it allows the defense. However, if state courts fashioning the defense are careful to
assure child support for children born out of wedlock equivalent to that of children born in
wedlock, the illegitimate-child equal protection problem can be avoided. This would in-
volve "compromise" solutions such as the one adopted by the lower court in Pamela P. v.
Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d at 343. See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Pamela P. compromise.
102 See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text for discussion of this compromise.
103 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-85 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
104 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
115 381 U.S. at 484-85.
'o' Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
107 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969).
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encompasses a freedom of choice as to procreation'08 which has
been extended to unmarried persons.'09 Because the privacy right
is fundamental, state infringement upon the right is justified only
if it comports with the "strict scrutiny" test. 0 Under this test, the
state must show a compelling state interest and that infringement
upon the privacy right is narrowly drawn to meet the state inter-
est."'
In Stephen .K. v. Roni L., the court denied recognition of a
cause of action for fraud between sexual partners when a woman
deceived a man by telling him she had taken contraceptive pre-
cautions. One factor the court considered was the constitutional
right to privacy. 2 The court explained that its supervision of this
private sexual conduct would "encourage unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters affecting the individual's right to
privacy."" 3 However, in Pamela P. v. Frank S., the trial court
used the same class of constitutional cases as a reason to allow a
defense of fraud with facts similar to those present in Stephen
K. "4 The court in Pamela P. noted the right to privacy cases
which establish a freedom of choice as to procreation.1"5 The
court explained that the woman had denied the man freedom of
procreative choice by deceiving him regarding her use of contra-
ceptives. The court reasoned that if the state"' did not recognize
the defense of fraud when the man had been deceived regarding
the use of birth control, the state might be interfering with the
man's constitutionally-based free choice as to procreation. Deny-
ing the fraud defense would compel the court to enforce a sup-
port order against the man. This, the court reasoned, would "put
108 Carey v. Population Serv., 431 U.S. 678, 684-91 (1977); 405 U.S. at 448-49; 316
U.S. at 541.
109 405 U.S. at 438.
"o Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); 381 U.S. at 485.
' 394 U.S. at 634; 381 U.S. at 485.
112 164 Cal. tlptr. at 620-21.
113 Id. at 620.
14 443 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
15 Id. at 346 (citing Carey v. Population Serv., 431 U.S. at 678; Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. at 438).
116 The court found state action based on the holding in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334




the 'imprimatur of the State' upon interference with reproduc-
tive choice."1 7 The appellate court rejected the argument that
the support order would put the state's imprimatur on the fraud-
ulent conduct and apparently followed the same view expressed
in the Stephen K. case, explaining that any inquiry into the sub-
ject constitutes an "impermissible invasion of the constitutional
right to privacy."""8
The trial court in Pamela P. recognized that when the "fun-
damental" right to privacy is involved, state regulation is justi-
fied only upon a showing of compelling state interest."' The
court found support for helpless children constituted a compell-
ing state interest which "justifies diminution of the right to free
procreative choice."' 20 Therefore, the court arrived at a hybrid
holding. Despite finding that denial of the fraud defense would
be an unconstitutional deprivation of free procreative choice, the
court concluded that the defense could be denied to the extent
necessary to satisfy child support needs the mother could not
meet. The lower court's decision was a compromise. However,
once the court accepted the right to privacy argument, 21 the
compromise decision may have been constitutionally required.
Under the compelling state interest test, state regulation which
infringes upon the constitutional right to privacy must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve the state interest.121 Denial of the fraud
defense only to the extent necessary to satisfy child support needs
is necessary to meet the constitutional requirement.
117 443 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 20).
118 451 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479). The al-
leged tortfeasor claims violation of privacy if the fraud defense is allowed and his or her
procreative/sexual conduct comes under state scrutiny. The defrauded party claims a pri-
vacy right violation if the defense is not allowed and the court enters a support order. The
problem is that both parties desire protection under the right to privacy but recognition of
that right for either necessarily involves diminution of the right for the other. Either way,
it is arguable whether state action exists as defined in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 18.
It should also be noted that Shelley was a racial discrimination case, not a right to privacy
case.
'19 443 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
120 Id. at 347-48.
121 Note that the appellate court rejected the man's right to privacy argument be-
cause it found no state action under Shelley. 451 N.Y.S.2d at 767.




The Stephen K. 12 court did not even discuss the compelling
state interest test. The court denied a fraud cause of action be-
cause it might constitute a violation of the alleged tortfeasor's
right to privacy in sexual conduct. If the court had wanted to
create a cause of action for fraudulent representations regarding
the use of contraceptives, it might have found a compelling state
interest in preventing fraud and in allowing its citizens to recover
when damaged by fraud. 124
The court in Stephen K. apparently assumed that any state
supervision of private sexual conduct constituted "unwarranted
governmental intrusion"2 5 into the right to privacy. As one au-
thority for its position that the right to privacy would be vio-
lated, the Stephen K. court cited Griswold v. Connecticut. 12 6
In Griswold, the Supreme Court struck down a state law for-
bidding the use of contraceptives as a violation of the right to pri-
vacy. 127 The Court reasoned that forbidding contraceptive use
would have a "maximum destructive impact"'2 upon the private
sexual relationship. The Stephen K. court therefore should have
considered whether allowing the fraud action would have a
"maximum destructive impact" on private sexual conduct. Al-
though allowing the fraud action might have some destructive ef-
fect on sexual privacy by subjecting the parties' sexual intimacy
to court supervision, it can be argued that denying the cause of
action would have an even greater destructive impact on sexual
privacy by permitting and maybe even encouraging fraud in inti-
mate relationships. If the Stephen K. court had considered both a
compelling state interest in preventing fraud and in allowing re-
covery to its defrauded citizens and the comparative potential for
destructive impact on sexual privacy, the court could have found
123 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
124 This would be a novel argument based on states' tenth amendment police
powers. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. However, if combined with the argument that the de-
frauded party also has a right to privacy in this context, the state's argument may be per-
suasive, especially in situations where the fraud action is a counterclaim in a paternity
action. In those situations, the alleged tortfeasor wants the state court to resolve matters
which originated in the sexual relationship.
125 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
126 Id. at 621 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479).
127 381 U.S. at 485.
128 Id. at 485.
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reason to allow the fraud cause of action consistent with the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on right to privacy.
CONCLUSION
Several arguments weigh against allowing either the cause of
action for fraud or defense of fraud when one sexual partner mis-
represents to the other that he or she used contraceptive precau-
tion. First, the proof problems are tremendous, possibly insur-
mountable. Second, courts are uncomfortable in the arena of
"intimate" relationships and therefore inclined to search for jus-
tifications to avoid allowing suits involving such relationships.
Third, several constitutional arguments can be made against
allowing the defense of fraud in support actions.
However, none of the reasons above against either the cause
of action or the defense are entirely persuasive. Although proof
probemg exist, these problems are no justification for denial of
the fraud action or defense. Fairness dictates that a defrauded
party should have recovery from the person causing an injury.
Equal protection problems in the defensive use of fraud can be
overcome by narrowly tailoring the defense to assure child sup-
port for illegitimate children. The constitutional rights to privacy
can be protected in both the cause of action for fraud and defense
of fraud. In the cause of action, infringement upon the right to
privacy may be justified by a compelling state interest in recov-
ery for fraud. When fraud is used as a defense, the state's com-
pelling state interest in child support justifies infringement upon
the man's right to free procreative choice. Therefore, both the
cause of action for fraud and the defense of fraud, if narrowly
drawn to comport with constitutional requirements, should be
recognized.
Diane M. Carlton
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